In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MARITAIN AS AN INTERPRETER OF AQUINAS ON THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION }UDE P. DOUGHERTY The Catholic University ofAmerica Washington, D.C. I T HE MEDIEVAL problem of individuation is not the contemporary problem of "individuals" or "particulars" discussed by P. F. Strawson, J. W. Meiland, and others.1 In a certain sense the problem of individuation originates with Parmenides, but it is Plato's philosophy of science that bequeaths (...) the problem to Aristotle and to his medieval commentators. Its solution in Aquinas is not that of Aristotle, nor is it that of Scotus or Suarez. Aquinas will distinguish between the problem of individuation and what we may call the problem of "individuality" or the problem of "subsistence." The solution to both will draw upon many Aristotelian distinctions but will incorporate key elements of St. Thomas's own metaphysics, including the real distinction between essence and existence and his doctrine of participation. It is Maritain's appropriation of St. Thomas's metaphysics that enables him to produce a realistic philosophy of science, one that he offers as compatible with contemporary scientific enquiry. It also enables him to develop a theory of person and personality. But the story begins with Plato. Although Plato's theory of knowledge may appear fanciful to the modern reader, his analysis of scientific knowledge contains a basic set of observations whose truth remains uncontested even 1 Cf. P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen and Co., 1959); J.W. Meiland, Talking About Particulars (New York: Humanities Press, 1970); P. Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966). 19 20 JUDE P. DOUGHERTY though his explanation be faulty. Plato saw clearly that science is of the universal. Things may be particular, but when we consider them as objects of enquiry, the intellect focuses upon the form taken as an exemplar. In Plato's explanation things belong to their various kinds by participating in incorporeal, eternal, and unchangeable archetypes. From a realist's vantage point the problem may be stated simply: Since things are singular, how is it that we intellectually apprehend them as universal? Aristotle's solution is well known and it is one adopted and amplified by St. Thomas. Universals are abstracted from singular things. No one would present Maritain as a medievalist, but, as an interpreter of Aquinas, he has wielded considerable influence in the United States and in Latin America. Many have come to St. Thomas under his tutelage. His knowledge of Aquinas is extensive and is drawn upon throughout his lifelong work, but perhaps nowhere more than in his philosophy of science and in his discussions of the person. The primary text for Thomas's doctrine of individuation is his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, where he discusses the division and methods of the sciences. Maritain's philosophy is indebted mainly to his reading of Thomistic texts, but he draws heavily, as well, on the works of his contemporaries, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Louis Geiger, and on those of the classic commentators on Thomas, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, and John of St. Thomas. Though employing St. Thomas, Maritain is always a man of the twentieth century. In books such as the Degrees of Knowledge, Science and Wisdom, Existence and the Existent, and A Preface to Metaphysics, his foe is always some contemporary exponent of a nominalist position.2 "Nominalists,'' he will say, "have a taste for the real, but no sense of being."3 Timeless 2 Degrees ofKnowledge [Les Degres du Savoir(l 932)], trans. G.B. Phelan, 4th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959); Science and Wisdom [Science et Sagesse (1935)], trans. B. Wall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940); Existence and the Existent [Court Traite de L:Existence et de L:Existant (1947)], trans. L. Galantiere and G.B. Phelan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948); A Preface to Metaphysics [Sept Le~ons sur L'Etre et les Premieres Principes de la Raison Speculative (1934)], trans. B. Wall (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939). 3 Degrees of Knowledge, 3. AN INTERPRETER OF AQUINAS 21 metaphysics, he will lament, no longer suits the modern intellect. "Three centuries of empirico-mathematics have so warped the intellect... (shrink)

ARISTOTLE'S Ethics are not focused on a group of moral principles; they are developed from the affirmation of an end which subordinates all human activities. This end is sought for itself and is called "the good and the best".

ARISTOTLE'S Ethics are not focused on a group of moral principles; they are developed from the affirmation of an end which subordinates all human activities. This end is sought for itself and is called "the good and the best".

In a few texts, Thomas Aquinas says that the first operation of the intellect pertains to (respicit) “the quiddity of a thing” whereas the second operation pertains to “the to be itself of a thing” (esse). But Aquinas also says that quiddities are to the intellect as color is to the power of sight. Statements such as these seem to have led Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson to see esse as the proper object of the intellect’s second (...) operation. Against this conclusion, Fr Régis and Ralph McInerny have argued—using Aquinas’s In I Peryermenias, lecture 5—that since ‘is’ is a verb and ‘is’ signifies existence, but all verbs signify the first operation of the intellect, we must be able to form a concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect. This paper does three things. First, it analyzes the nature of the claim made by Maritain and Gilson. Second, it shows from internal textual evidence that “respicit ipsum esse rei” cannot mean what Maritain and Gilson take it to mean. The second operation of the intellect cannot have a proper object distinct from the object of the first operation, which is quiddities. Finally, this paper provides an alternative interpretation of In I Peryermenias, lecture 5, to the one given by McInerny. In that text, Aquinas does not speak about a particular concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect and signified by the verbs ‘is’ or ‘exists.’ Rather, he uses the word ‘esse’ in indirect speech to include generally any form or act joined to a subject by the copula, ‘is.’ Aquinas’s focus is not on what ‘esse’ or ‘est’ signifies, but on the mode in which it signifies (per modum actualitas) absent additional qualifying terms. The conclusion of this paper is that, although the esse contrasted with essence in Aquinas’s metaphysics corresponds to a concept in the intellect’s first operation, nevertheless, like the notions of blindness and of genus, this esse cannot fall properly within the intellect’s object. (shrink)

In this article, I would like to present a brief overview of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. I try to express the cognitive processes that this model of the mind describes in more modern terminology (e.g., I interpret ‘an image’ [phantasm] as the binding effect of monomodal representations of a perceived object). Characteristic of this model is the postulation, in the case of the human mind, of intellectual abstraction leading to concepts, which requires assuming the existence of the intellect in (...) its active and passive aspects. In this context, a metaphysical conclusion can be drawn about the immortal nature of this intellect, according to Thomas. On the other hand, this model of the mind is not, to all appearances, a variant of Platonic-Cartesian dualism – Aquinas makes several arguments against dualism understood in this way, at least one of which was still raised by (non-Thomistic) critics of Descartes. In addition, Thomas points to the developmental aspect of the human mind and also attempts to describe the possible functioning of the intellect after death. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: ch. 1 The Cry of Rachel -- Maritain's 1942 Marquette Aquinas Lecture -- Maritain's The Person and the Common Good -- Camus's The Plague -- ch. 2 Joy -- Being as the Good and the Eruption of Willing -- Being and Philosophical Psychology -- An Ordinary Knowledge of God and Metaphysics -- Metaphysics as Implicit Knowledge -- Being and the Intellectual Emotions -- ch. 3 Quandoque Evils -- Aquinas's Rationale for the Corruptible (...) Order -- The Corruptible Order and Quandoque Evils -- Bracketing Quandoque Evils between Goods -- A Caveat in Understanding the Subject of the Consequent Good -- The Effect of Human Providence upon the Frequency of Quandoque Evils -- ch. 4 Natural Corruptions -- Death as a Natural Corruption -- Natural Corruption as Nondefinitive -- Ambiguity of "Praeter Intentionem" and "Per Accidens" -- God and the Evil of Punishment (Poena) -- Other Interpretations -- Abraham and Isaac -- Conclusion -- ch. 5 Preliminaries to Aquinas and the Contemporary Discussion -- C.G. III, 71: "If Evil Exists, God Exists" -- William Rowe on Cosmological Reasoning -- De Ver. X, 12, ad 10m: "If not God from Justice, then God from Some Other Effect" -- Summary of Aquinas on the Existence of Evil -- A Strategy -- ch. 6 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Personalist Theodicies -- Marilyn McCord Adams and "Horrendous Evils" -- William Hasker: Personal Satisfaction and World Approval -- John Hick: Creation as a Gymnasium for the Development of Our Virtues -- David Ray Griffin and the Denial of Genuine Evils -- The Brothers Karamazov -- Thomistic "Natural Desires" of the Human Person -- ch. 7 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Cosmological Theodicies -- Diogenes Allen and Suffering as an Experience of God -- David Hume and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, X and XI -- William Rowe and "Pointless Evils" -- J. L. Mackie and Further Objections to a Cosmological Theodicy -- Mackie's Fourth Criticism and Aquinas on the Causality of Human Choices -- Aquinas and Plantinga -- The Avoidance of Determinism -- The Avoidance of Divine Culpability -- A Thomistic Free Will Defense? -- Richard Swinburne: Nature as a Necessary Display Case for Our Knowledge of Good and Evil -- Bruce Reichenbach: Developing Plantinga and Swinburne -- ch. 8 Conclusion and Comparison to Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump -- Brian Davies's Apophatic Treatment of the Evil Problem -- Eleonore Stump and the Love of God -- The Consolation of Rachel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WAiINWRIGHT, MARI'.rAIN, AND AQUINAS ON TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES1 Lours RoY, O.:P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts WHAT COULD ALLOW thoo1ogiianis to s1ay that rbrtanJScendent expmiences we, exiplicitly or implicitly, expenienoos of God? To ooswieir tMs question fully, one would ihavie Ibo ooga;ge in :two d:iisltmot mqumi1es. Fiirsit, religious, moml, iand psyoho101 giical icristeci:a 1are required in the evtalurution of concrete oases. They ctan he found in rthe grerut spi:ritUJal (...) wriitings of humankind. Secood, one mustt have reOOUTISe to ep;iisttemo1ogiica:l :and thieo1ogiaa1 foru.ndmbions if one wianits 1to 1an.swer tb.ie questtion in. its generality. ln,thJi:s a:riticle, I shall not preserut 1tihe religious, moral, 1and psychofogica1 criteria, because I sihou1d Jrike to OOiilCelllb:iaJte on mrueillecrtUJal prohliems invohiimg tihe sooond kmd of ·consideration. I shiaill use ais 1a ISl'bar:bing-pomt 1a book on mys:ticism written by Wiilliiam J. W1ainwcight. Turr tihe purposes of ttihis ess:ay, "trlanJScenidelllt experiences" wiilil. mean whmt W1affin:WI"ight calls " mystical experienoos " or " uniJtM"Y srbrubeis." 2 The phvase wi:ll. ailso inclUJde Otito'1s " nu:minoUJs etpeirieinces," Mrusforw's " peak expeme:nces" and, vecy hrorudJy, wll experiences that do not :focus on 1a, specific tidea :but afiectively open up to the mySltery wll:uich enoompas1ses hruman li£e. 1 I am grateful to the members of the Boston Theological Society for their questions and comments on the initial version of this essay. 2See his definition, in Mysticism: A. Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), IS. The rest of his first chapter offers a good discussion of problems of typology as well as of the distinction between descriptions and interpretations of mystical experiences. Unfortunately I cannot take account of this interesting discussion in the limits of this paper. 655 656 LOUIS ROY, O.P. In conrtending thrut my:stical experieTIJces ihav;e nnetic v:al,idity if they are ra speciiaI kind of perception, W ainw~igrhit tries to 'Settle an 1:epis1temo10-gicra1l is1sue; ill downplaying "doctrina1l con-.sideration:s" and iJn rejeobing ",a thieo1ogical op~nion whioh cannoit he esbaiblished ihy philosoplhi1oal rea1s10n," 3 he suggesit,s 1bhat his oolJJ!teTIJtiion can 1and should he 1supp01rted only by philosophioal a11gumelJJ!t1s. In thi'S esisay, I intend 1to ques1truon thi:s two.fo1d 1tlhesis of Wwinwrrtiight'1s 1and to explore an albernartive. Wa:inwright, whose manner of dea1ing wirbh iinitellectuaJ proh1ems 1acoo,rds with \the p11esent-day main lme in Ang1o-American philosophy of re1i§ion,4 non:ebheless pays metiiculou:s a.trbention Ito neoscho1a1s1tic theori!es of mys1tiioism in Chapter 4 of his hook. Such 1an a;t1t:empt 1at serious diJalogue is of specia,l :intel'es1t since :i:t illu:stria1tes the diffioulty of finding a mee1ting ground for three qUJite different scho1w1·Jy wo,rlds: the p0:s1t-rpie1t~st one, wihich I regard a,s W,ruinwr.ighit'·s, modern sohoilais1t1icrsm, and Thomas Aquinas. A1though W1a1inwr1igh1t does not refer 1 to the lat:ter's views on the.topic, these views nev:erthe1e:s,s de:serve examination bo1th 1a1s the sou11oe of neoscho:iJa,stic 1theorie1s and 1as conti :ia:sting in 1s1 evera1 111espects wiith,them. The first pa~t of my paper will sketch three of the intellec1tuaJ contexits in which triam:soendefll!t experi!enoes may be discussed. The second part will highlight some features of Aquinrus's episitmnology and theo1ogy of gmce which whll enable us fo dertel'ITl!iDJe 1 at whait levels of cogn:iition experienceis of 1t11amiscendence should be s]tua1ted 1 and in what 1s1ense they may rbe s1aid to he experielll!ceis of God. 'Iihe third rpart wm presie111t how Thomais envisages the role of love :in 1the affective knowledge tha1t rbe1ieviers i;eceiive of God. F1inailly, the fomlth pamt will indicrabe the modial~ty of such lmowledge, namely, the dimect a1iva:renerss of orur aets and fee1ings of 1ove. a Wainwright, 162-163 and 180. 4 Exemplified by such authors as John Hick, Stephen Katz, Ninian Smart, Walter T. Stace, R. C. Zaehner. TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES 657 I. Three lnterprretative Contexts Since Schleiermadher, moist German... (shrink)

RESUMEN Se aborda en particular su relectura de Aristóteles y Tomás de Aquino, junto con su análisis de algunas discusiones relevantes en las ciencias sociales. Según Macintyre, el abandono del aristotelismo y su esquema teleológico de la investigación filosófica y de la razón práctica ha generado confusión e incoherencia en las articulaciones conceptuales de la filosofía moral moderna y contemporánea. En opinión de este autor, en el concepto de tradición el presente es considerado una reapropiación del pasado, lo que brinda (...) coherencia a las argumentaciones. A los fines de este trabajo se opta por una aproximación a medio camino entre una metodología analítica y una historia conceptual basada en el reconocimiento de distintas discusiones de las cuales se nutren los conceptos macinteryanos. Finalmente, se valoran las contribuciones de Macintyre a la vez que se indican algunas limitaciones de su tesis. ABSTRACT The article specifically addresses Macintyre's rereading of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, as well as his analysis of certain relevant discussions in the social sciences. According to the author, abandoning Aristotelianism and its teleological scheme of philosophical research and practical reason has generated confusion and incoherence in the conceptual formulations of modern and contemporary moral philosophy. In Macintyre's view, the concept of tradition considers the present as a reappropriation of the past, thus bringing coherence to argumentation. For purposes of this paper, we have adopted an approach that is halfway between analytical methodology and conceptual history, based on the acknowledgment of different discussions that nurture Macintyre's concepts. Finally, the article assesses the philosopher's contributions, while also pointing out some of the limitations of his thesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity by Roberto Di CeglieGregory StaceyDI CEGLIE, Roberto. Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity. New York: Routledge, 2022. x + 196 pp. Cloth, $160.00Suppose one wishes to argue that Christian faith (that is, supernatural belief in propositions insofar as they are divinely revealed) is compatible with the proper exercise of reason (that is, forming beliefs through natural cognitive processes). Two strategies (...) suggest themselves. First, one could argue that faith is itself a natural cognitive process or else meets criteria by which natural beliefs are considered rational or appropriate. Alternatively, one might contend that faith can meet its own, independent criteria for rationality or propriety. Thomas Aquinas, whose natural theology and discussion of public evidence that God has revealed himself in Christ are famously robust, may appear to be an exponent of the former strategy. Yet in this volume, Roberto Di Ceglie advances a reading of Thomas that illustrates how faith can support rational enquiry, while remaining independent of it. On this view, faith is "caused mainly by God" and is therefore "at least partly unresponsive to rational criteria."Part 1 begins Di Ceglie's case obliquely, by criticizing both efforts to argue (following Gilson and Maritain) that philosophy can be influenced by Christian faith and recent attempts to explain Aquinas's account of faith and reason. Reviewing the work of commentators including Anthony Kenny, Richard Swinburne, and Eleonore Stump, the author objects that many philosophers hold that for Thomas, faith is primarily a form of propositional belief that should be evaluated for propriety in the same way as natural beliefs. He alleges that this understanding of faith is inherited from Locke, who endorsed "methodological naturalism": the view that appropriate "religious belief can only be taken as the outcome, if any, of a rational exploration of our experience." While this material usefully outlines views which Di Ceglie means to oppose, readers unfamiliar with scholarship on Aquinas and Locke may find these initial chapters difficult to follow.The argument becomes easier to follow in part 2, which provides Di Ceglie's own interpretation of Aquinas. The key third chapter explores Aquinas's definition of faith as "an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine Truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God" (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 9). It demonstrates that while for Aquinas faith involves firm propositional belief, its certitude derives not from believers' assessment of signs that God has revealed the articles of faith but from their free choice—itself a gift of grace—to embrace those articles. More precisely, in cases of "formed" faith, this choice is motivated by supernatural love for God (charity). Charity's role in Aquinas's religious epistemology is [End Page 547] highlighted in two subsequent chapters. Inter alia, Di Ceglie charges that faith is meritorious principally due to its grounds in charity rather than because the articles of faith are not evidently true. He further claims that Aquinas understood "unformed" faith as merely "faith commonly so called"—that is, natural belief in propositions because one judges that they are testified to by a competent authority. Accordingly, unformed faith lacks perfect confidence because it is merely based on probabilistic evidence that God has revealed the articles of faith, rather than on a strong, loving will to trust God. More generally, the certitude of one's faith is proportionate to the perfection of one's charity.Having developed a reading of Aquinas's religious epistemology that stresses the distinction between faith and reason, in part 3 Di Ceglie considers their positive relationship. First, he attempts to reconcile the apparently opposing views that Aquinas's philosophy is purely an exercise of natural reason, and that his philosophical work was influenced by his Christian faith. Broadly, the charity that grounds formed faith also inspires and enhances rational investigation, although philosophical arguments cannot presume faith's truth. Believers with formed faith, however, should reject positions that contradict faith and seek to revise their philosophical reasoning accordingly. The final chapter argues that Christian faith affords a better position from which to engage in rational reflection than atheism or agnosticism. Among other advantages, faith... (shrink)

As Aquinas makes explicit, the argument of the Summa contra gentiles is ordered according to the twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. The first three books thus concern the wisdom which revelation announces but which nonetheless is available to natural human reason, while the fourth is devoted to that revealed wisdom incommensurate with human rationality. Interpreters of the SCG have been divided, however, on the question of how these two modes of truth are related in (...) regard to the structure and method of the work. Thomas Hibbs's provocative and engaging new study of the SCG proposes that the unity between them is found primordially in God Himself ; it is found, more precisely, in God as Author of the narrative of Christian revelation which orders the wisdom of the philosophers to Wisdom strictly considered. (shrink)

Jacques Maritain's An Introduction to Philosophy was first published in 1931. Since then, this book has stood the test of time as a clear guide to what philosophy is and how to philosophize. Inspired by the Thomistic Revival called for by Leo XIII, Maritain relies heavily on Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to shape a philosophy that, far from sectarian theology in disguise, is driven by reason and engages the modern world. Re-released as part of the Sheed (...) & Ward Classic series, An Introduction to Philosophy is sure to enliven the minds of students and general readers for years to come. From the new introduction by Ralph McInerny: You are about to read a magnificent introduction not only to a kind of philosophy but to philosophizing itself. Jacques Maritain was a relatively young man when he wrote this book, but his effort is one that attracts any philosopher more and more as he grows older. However odd and unusual what he says becomes, the philosopher yearns to show how even the most abstruse claims can be put into relation with what the reader already knows. That, in its essence, is what teaching is. In this book, the reader will find a wise and certain guide into philosophizing as such. And, in the end, he will find that what he reads is really only a refinement and development of what he and everybody else already knew. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 439-440 [Access article in PDF] John F. Wippel. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being. Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, No. 1. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2000. Pp. xxvii + 630. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $39.95. In this weighty volume, John Wippel brings together much of the important research that he (...) has carried out on the metaphysics of Aquinas over the last three decades in order to produce as he calls it, a "Summa metaphysicae" based on the original texts of Aquinas (xxvii). Throughout much of the twentieth century metaphysics has been thought to be Aquinas's greatest philosophical achievement. The historical research of Etienne Gilson and Joseph Owens together with the philosophical reflections of Jacques Maritain did much to place this topic at the heart of Aquinas scholarship. Therefore, this volume both represents Wippel's central research interest and brings to a head an entire school of Aquinas studies of the twentieth century. It is the clearest and most detailed account of the subject in the English language, bearing the hallmarks of Wippel's scholarship: clarity in reference to the arguments and attention to textual chronology.Metaphysics here does not mean so much a focus on Aquinas's treatment of Aristotle's four causes or his act and potency as much as a clear presentation of Aquinas's reflections on existence (esse) and the implications that this has for his thought. After an introductory discussion of the nature and subject of metaphysics for Aquinas, Wippel devotes the first part of the book to Aquinas's view of existence in order to unpack what it means to talk about individual things as beings, being in general, and the catagories of Aristotle (73-74). Masterfully, he explains Aquinas's analogical approach to being and guides the reader through the interpretive thicket of Cornelio Fabro, G. P. Klubertanz, and Ralph McInerny. An interesting parallel is presented between Parmenides' problem of the one and the many and Aquinas's philosophically interesting view of the composite manner in which concrete individuals exist (161-170). Since no individual creature is the author of its own existence, but does in fact exist, each finite being must receive existence from a single being that exists necessarily. Wippel highlights this and other approaches that Aquinas takes to clarify relations between the many individual beings and the single divine being that lies beyond the study of metaphysics.Part two is devoted to many of the ways in which Aquinas talks about concrete individuals. Here Wippel explains Aquinas's distinctions between substance and accident as well as between matter and form and how they relate to existence. Part three concludes the work with a treatment of what Aristotle and Aquinas call divine science. This consists of more than a hundred pages on Aquinas's famous arguments for the existence of God (379-500) and a discussion of what human beings can understand about God (501-575). Not only does Aquinas conclude that God exists, but he indicates the limited manner in which human beings can understand the divine. The problem is that if we acquire language in relation to concrete individuals, how can we use words to discuss a being who is not bound by space or time? The solution is to speak of words like "good" and "wise" in an analogical sense. Words like these when applied to creatures are used in a sense that is both similar to but different from the way they are used to [End Page 439] speak of the divine. Reiterating the theme of the one and the many, the name "good" has a single and most excellent meaning when applied to God and a limited sense when applied to creatures.This is an excellent and accessible book for the educated reader and specialist alike which can be supplemented by works such as Wayne Hankey's God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in theSumma Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford... (shrink)

Presenting with moving insight the relations between man, as a person and as an individual, and the society of which he is a part, Maritain's treatment of a lasting topic speaks to this generation as well as those to come. Maritain employs the personalism rooted in Aquinas's doctrine to distinguish between social philosophy centered in the dignity of the human person and that centered in the primacy of the individual and the private good.

This original translation, by Edward H. Flannery, brings you one of Maritain s most eye-opening studies of Christianity. Although not his most famous work, Maritain s An Essay on Christian Philosophy provides readers with an in-depth analysis and careful philosophical approach to the study of theology and, at the time of original publication, was considered to be the definitive statement of the Thomistic position. Discover his theses for yourself as Maritain considers the nature of philosophy, morality, and (...) their relations to Christianity with clarity and a scholarly attention to detail. Flannery provides English readers with a glossary of terms to bring further understanding to Maritain s original words. Jacques Maritain was a French Catholic philosopher and political thinker. He was born in Paris in 1882, where he spent most of his life. His father was a prominent lawyer and his mother the daughter of a statesman. He attended the Sorbonne to study philosophy and natural science, and after marrying, he and his wife converted to Catholicism. It was after this he became a well-known scholar of St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomistic philosophy. He published widely on philosophical and political thought, and by the 1930s, he was an established thinker in the Catholic community. After the outbreak of WWII, Maritain relocated to the United States, where he taught at Princeton University and Columbia University. Later in life, he and his wife returned to France, where he continued to write and study Catholic scholarship until his death in 1973. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral ScienceColleen McCluskeyDenis J. M. Bradley. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997. Pp. vii-xiv + 610.In this book, Bradley examines whether one can construct an autonomous Thomistic philosophical ethics from Thomas Aquinas's theologically (...) flavored moral writings. In order to answer this question, Bradley provides a comprehensive analysis not only of Aquinas's moral psychology, but also of the Aristotelian doctrines which to a certain extent provide its foundation. Bradley begins with a look at Aristotle's concept of a science, his notion of practical reasoning, and his accounts of deliberation, choice, and the ultimate end for human beings. Bradley also discusses Aquinas's interpretations of those theories and the extent to which Aquinas's views follow and diverge from Aristotle's writings. The metaphysical principles grounding the notions of a science, of being, and of goodness and their connections to Aquinas's ethics are noted and explained. In his discussion of the moral theory itself, Bradley frames his presentation around Aquinas's theory of action (especially its volitional aspects and the workings of practical reason) and the role of natural law, although the virtues are not neglected. Bradley's treatment throughout the book is meticulous (although in my view somewhat repetitive).The most interesting aspect of this book is Bradley's discussion of the paradoxical nature of Aquinas's ethical theory. As he notes, Aquinas's theory has a teleological orientation; his system is structured around the idea that human beings have a particular ultimate end. Aquinas argues that due to their nature, all human beings desire to attain their ultimate end. As is also well-known, Aquinas specifies that this end is the beatific vision and that only the vision of the divine essence is able to satisfy completely [End Page 118] all human desires. However, this end is not only inaccessible to human beings in this life, but one that they are unable to obtain without the aid of God's grace. But it follows from this that human beings have a natural desire that cannot be satisfied naturally, a paradoxical position, especially for an Aristotelian. For according to Bradley, Aquinas argues that although one can establish through philosophical arguments that human beings have a natural desire which only God can satisfy, no philosophical argument can establish that God, in fact, ever satisfies this desire. That God chooses to do so is a matter of faith and revelation. Thus, as far as philosophy is concerned, human beings may have been structured with an unsatisfiable desire. This violates an important Aristotelian notion about teleology, the idea that there can be no futile natural desire. The inability to satisfy a natural desire for an ultimate end renders a teleologically based system incoherent. It follows that. given his characterization of the ultimate end, a characterization that Aquinas thinks he can establish on philosophical grounds alone, his purely theological commitments are integral and necessary components of his moral system. Thus, Bradley's answer to the question he raises in the book is no, one cannot construct an autonomous Thomistic philosophical ethics from Aquinas's moral writings.In the process of arriving at this conclusion, Bradley critiques the work of two philosophers, Jacques Maritain and Santiago M. Ramirez, both of whom argue that a purely philosophical ethics can be built out of Aquinas's writings, although both maintain that Aquinas himself did not do so. Maritain and Ramirez take Thomistic philosophical ethics to retain basic Christian beliefs but to be established on the basis of natural reasoning processes alone, independently of revelation. Bradley raises a number of objections against their characterizations of Thomistic ethics, among them the worry that, ultimately, such philosophical systems are not truly independent of a theological ethics (pace Maritain) and the charge that Aquinas's characterizations of the supernatural nature of the human ultimate end is not taken seriously (Ramirez).Space permits only a cursory examination of some general concerns over Bradley's position. Bradley argues that what is fundamental to... (shrink)

With Narrative and the Natural Law Pamela Hall brings Thomistic ethics into conversation with ongoing debates in contemporary moral philosophy, especially virtue theory and moral psychology, and with current trends in narrative theory and the philosophy of history. Pamela M. Hall's study offers a solid, challenging alternative to rigid, legalistic interpretations of the substantial discussion of law in Aquinas's Summa theologiae and defends Aquinas's ethics from charges of excessive legalism. Hall argues that Aquinas's characterization of the content (...) and relationship of natural, human and divine law indicates that his understanding of the quest for the human good is practical, communal, and historical. Hall maintains that natural law, the ongoing inquiry into what is the human good, is narrative both in terms of its internal structure and its being informed by the specific story of Scripture. According to Aquinas the discovery of natural law is enacted historically and progressively within communities and by individuals through a process of practical reasoning. Hall then goes on to show how natural law requires articulation by human law, and how both are connected to divine law (salvation history) as Aquinas understands it. Aquinas represents inquiry into the human good as a kind of historical narrative or story with stages or "chapters"; thus knowledge of natural law requires time and experience, as well as sustained reflection by individuals and by whole communities. Such learning of natural law implies the operation of prudence and the assistance of the moral virtues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dieu comme soi-même: connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu selon Thomas d’Aquin: l’herméneutique d’Ambroise Gardeil by Camille de BelloyThomas M. Osborne Jr.Dieu comme soi-même: connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu selon Thomas d’Aquin: l’herméneutique d’Ambroise Gardeil. By Camille de Belloy, O.P. Paris: Vrin, 2014. Pp. 297. €32.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-2-7116-2605-2.This book is a discussion of La Structure de l’âme et l’expérience mystique (1927) by Ambroise Gardeil (...) (1859–1931). In this two-volume work of mystical theology, Gardeil explains the material cause of the experiential knowledge that comes from the gift of wisdom, which is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. La Structure is the third book in a trilogy that focuses on the supernatural knowledge of God, beginning with apologetics in La Crédibilité et l’apologétique (1st ed. 1908), and continuing with the nature of revelation in Le Donné révélé et la théologie (1st ed. 1910). In La Structure, Gardeil develops the thesis that there is an analogy between experiential self-knowledge and the mystical experiential knowledge of God. In the course of his inquiry, Gardeil touches upon philosophical and theological problems concerning self-knowledge, intentionality, the structure of the mind (mens), God’s indwelling in the souls of the just, and the relationship between faith and the gift of wisdom. De Belloy’s new volume is on Gardeil’s presentation of this analogy and its reception by his contemporaries.De Belloy considers largely the issues that surround self-knowledge, the structure of the soul, and mystical experience. He draws together material from Gardeil’s own sources, Gardeil’s contemporaries, and subsequent Thomistic scholarship. He sheds light on the issues themselves, the historical context, and different hermeneutical strategies in Thomism. According to De Belloy, this twentieth-century Thomistic and largely Dominican discussion is important for contemporary philosophers and theologians. To shed light on the context, De Belloy considers a lengthy three-part “Examen de conscience” in Revue Thomiste (1928–29), in which Gardeil responded to published and unpublished comments by his fellow Dominicans Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (a former student), Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin (Le Saulchoir), and Albino González Menéndez-Reigada, as well as a young student, Jean Daujat. De Belloy remarks that Maritain’s discussion of Gardeil in The Degrees of Knowledge to some extent attempts to harmonize the substance of Gardeil’s work with Garrigou-Lagrange’s critical comments. De Belloy emphasizes the interaction between Gardeil and Roland-Gosselin, and at the end of his volume, includes their previously unpublished correspondence.Although De Belloy often notes the difficulty of reading Gardeil’s neo-Scholastic prose, it seems to me that the non-native French reader will find Gardeil more accessible than De Belloy, especially when the latter draws on writers such as Henri Bergson and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Moreover, De Belloy’s discussion is easier to follow if one has already read and is familiar with the four parts of Gardeil’s La Structure. In part 1, Gardeil addresses the structure of mind or spirit (mens), and in particular considers Augustine’s [End Page 472] three main, threefold divisions of the soul in De Trinitate (mens, notitia, amor; memoria [sui], intelligentia, voluntas; memoria [Dei], intelligentia, amor) and Aquinas’s own interpretation and appropriation of these divisions. In part 2, Gardeil describes the way in which sanctifying grace, a created quality that is distinct from the infused virtues, causes the soul’s conformity to God’s essence. In part 3, he discusses God’s presence within the souls of the just and agrees with previous Thomists that God is especially present to the just as an object of faith and love. In part 4, he applies the previous discussion to the structure of mystical knowledge. This last part is the culmination of the entire work, as it addresses the analogy between self-knowledge and the knowledge of God that was defended by earlier Dominican Thomists such as John of St. Thomas (1589–1644) and Thomas de Vallgornera (c. 1595–1665).Part... (shrink)

Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that Aquinas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level. The author suggests that we can discern reasons for this move by examining Aquinas's commentary on the "Sententiae" of Peter the Lombard and the "Summa (...) theologiae" within their historical context. The author's thesis is that Dominican pastoral and intellectual concerns led Aquinas to argue that moral virtue must necessarily be ordered toward the highest good. Understanding this purpose helps to explain his presentation of moral virtue and its implications for standard philosophical interpretations of his work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue by David DecosimoTravis KroekerEthics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue David Decosimo stanford, ca: stanford university press, 2014. 376 pp. $65.00 / $29.95If "debeo distinguere" represents the programmatic scholarly agenda for "prophetic Thomism," over against the more mystical narrative "exitus et reditus" itinerary of Dionysian Augustinianism, David Decosmio should be considered (...) a virtuous practitioner of this Thomistic craft in the domain of political ethics. To put it more accurately, Decosimo provides a complex, lucid account of his reading of Thomas as one who tutors Christians and especially Christian ethicists through "fraternal correction" in what it means to provide a generous, charitable account of "pagan virtue" via the making of distinctions. For Decosimo the word "pagan" refers to non-Christian "outsiders"—that is, "all those without charity" (11). While that may seem to be a noncharitable way to put it, Decosimo means it to bespeak that form of charity that allows non-Christians to be and to speak as non-Christians, absent (or refusing) those virtues that Thomas calls "theological"—those habits infused supernaturally by God through the "redemptive grace" that orders and unites humans "in loving friendship with the God revealed in Jesus Christ" (11). Thomas's representative pagan is, of course, Aristotle. Decosimo insists that a correct reading of Thomas opposes both "hyper-Augustinian Thomism" (on which account non-Christians are incapable of true virtue) as well as a "public reason Thomism" (which avoids theological claims). At the same time, Decosimo claims that Thomas remains fully Augustinian in his theological account of charity and yet "unites and transforms Aristotle and Augustine alike to teach charity toward outsiders and their virtues" (1). To put it in terms of the formula Decosimo reiterates throughout the book, Aquinas "strives to be Aristotelian by being Augustinian and vice versa" (41, 70, 181 253, etc.). In so doing, he offers resources for a prophetic Thomism that more charitably navigates the church's relations to secular politics by welcoming the contributions of pagan virtue to its own Christian virtue.If "charity's scholarly work is the multiplication of distinctions" (8) then Decosimo's book is a model of charity. Decosimo works as an analytic philosopher at a high level of erudition to elucidate the linguistic and syllogistic puzzles in Thomas's accounts of virtue in a close reading of a range of works to show that, for Thomas, natural human virtue oriented toward the shared human and political good (the highest good attainable without charity) is true [End Page 199] virtue in which Christians and non-Christians, Augustinians and Aristotelians, may fully share and participate together. Indeed, the theological virtues must be devoted to the charitable interpretation of all contributions dialectically considered and ordered to the highest human good. Only by adhering to such a vision of virtue that welcomes pagan virtue will Christians practice the ethics of charity, and prophetic Thomism provides a model for how the church may engage difference in a way that honors others while being faithful to its own vision of the gift of grace.I hope it will not be taken as uncharitable or (ugh!) "hyper-Augustinian" to suggest that Decosimo's account of prophetic Thomism is more attuned to Aristotelian logic and the dialectic of definitional distinctions than it is to Augustine's more Platonic account of pagan virtue as a Dionysian erotic dialectic in which the "logos is wild." But I am in full agreement with Decosimo's claim that ethics as a work of charity ought to be open to both (and "all") in providing resources to Christian and non-Christian ethicists alike for engaging contemporary political challenges concerning otherness and difference in the service of justice.Travis KroekerMcMaster UniversityCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Cajetan’s analogy theory is usually evaluated in terms of its fidelity to the teachings of Aquinas. But what if Cajetan was trying to answer questions Aquinas himself did not raise, and so could not help to answer? Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia can be interpreted as intending to solve a particular semantic problem: to characterize the unity of the analogical concept, so as to defend the possibility of a non-univocal term’s mediating syllogistic reasoning. Aquinas offers various semantic characterizations (...) of analogy, saying it involves, for instance: signification per prius et posterius; or a ratio propria which is only found in one analogate; or diverse modi significandi with a common res significata. Examined in turn, it is clear that none of Aquinas’s rules for analogy solve the semantic problem described. Cajetan thus cannot be reasonably expected to have intended his analogy treatise primarily as an interpretation or systematization of Aquinas’s teaching on analogy. (shrink)

This critique of Henri Bergson is Jacques Maritain's first book. In it he shows he has a grasp of the thought of St Thomas Aquinas and an ability to show its relevance to other systems such as that of Bergson. This text presents Jacques Maritain's as a philosopher, a Thomist and a critic.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:318 BOOK REVIEWS ture. But when it comes to love, " we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union." Thomas underscores what Outka calls the " inclusive " conception of universal love. God is to be loved as the supreme good, as the source of all happiness; the neighbor is loved as sharing in the happiness we receive from God. Charity eviscerates (...) neither our natural inclination for happiness nor our natural associations with others. Rather, it " commands each act of other sorts of friendship " in relation to our friendship with God. Charity is inherently prudential and thus an account of " special relations,'' which Werpehowski and others address, is incorporated into the discussion of charity. Of course one might make the same objection against Thomas's appropriation of Aristotle that I have leveled against the appropriation of modern notions. But Aristotle is not so much a secular rival of Christianity as he is a philosopher of human nature. A return to Christian Aristotelianism is suggested by Kierkegaard's dictum that we have forgotten what it means to be Christian because we have forgotten what it means to be human. THOMAS s. HIBBS Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA The Trinity: An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the "De Trinitate" of Boethius. By DOUGLAS C. HALL. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 33. Leiden/New York: Brill, 1992. Pp. vi + 131. $40 (cloth). Aquinas's expositio of the De Trinitate of Boethius is an admirable paradigm of profound analysis and interpretive genius. Adhering closely to a literal reading of the short sexpartite Boethian tractate, but breaking off his analysis (for reasons unknown) just before the end of section two where Boethius begins his ex professo treatment of the Trinity, Aquinas ends up mainly plumbing the depth of Boethius's prefatory remarks about the epistemological status of theology, and thus in six questions (comprising 24 articles) constructs the most extensive treatment in all his works of the nature and method of theology. Little wonder, then, that Leo Elders titles his introduction to the expositio of Aquinas Faith and Science (Rome, 1974) or that Armand Maurer names his two volume translation of it Faith, Reason and Theology and The Division and Methods of the Sciences (Toronto, 198687 ). In Thomas's commentary, only the fourth article of question three treats the doctrine of the Trinity directly, though the four articles of BOOK REVIEWS 319 question four also discuss the cause of plurality, a crucial topic for trinitarian theology. I was mildly surprised, then, that Douglas Hall gives the title The Trinity to what professes to offer a " careful textual analysis and criticism " (112) of the methods and contents of Aquinas's commentary. In this slender book of four chapters, Hall inserts, between a short introduction and a conclusion, a second chapter on all five of Boethius's tractates and a third on Aquinas's commentary on the De Trinitate. He has some interesting things to say about the dating and contents of the Boethian works, and also makes some good points about Thomas's commentary, especially as regards questions five and six. But the title is a misnomer, for Hall skips over lightly the five articles mentioned above where Aquinas treats trinitarian issues, devoting only three pages to them. Hall's main concern, like Aquinas's, is theological methodology and epistemology. Hall attempts a rather Hegelian, dialectical appraisal of Aquinaswhich stresses Aquinas's reconstruction of Boethius by highlighting their common methodological theme of agnosia-and links it with an integrative approach which grounds itself in " a transcendental reading of Aquinas, while retaining themes from participationist and analogical literature" (112). The first chapter discusses the participationist, analogical, and transcendental strains of contemporary Thomism, and evinces a certain predilection for Rahner (his influence is also evident on pages 50, 58, 92-95). In sum, Hall combines a Rahnerian and dialectical reading of Aquinas. Due to his presupposition, however, he frequently does not engage Aquinas on his own grounds but burdens him with false problems and dubious theses as he seeks to sort out Aquinas's " dialectical tensions." Often the result is a rather gratuitous reading encumbered with unsubstantiated non sequiturs that... (shrink)

The dissertation entitled Jacques Maritain and the Centrality of Intuition is a study in the influence of Henri Bergson's notion of intuition in the thought of Jacques Maritain. It is argued that Maritain used tenets from Thomistic philosophy to transform Bergsonian intuition, first by putting intuition back into the intellect from which Bergson in fact severed it. It is also argued that, although Bergson in fact put a wedge between intellect and intuition, that was not his intention. (...) Because Bergson in fact separated intuition from the intellect, however, Maritain accused him of being anti-intellectual. Contrary to Maritain's criticism, it is argued that Bergson was anti-intellectual only in the sense of criticizing a bad use of intelligence, but not in the sense of criticizing intelligence as such. Maritain then interprets Bergson's intuition as an immediate knowledge of reality in two ways: first, as the intellectual metaphysical intuition of being yielding a concept of being as being in its analogical amplitude and as not intrinsically linked to matter; second, as various and analogous modes of intuition by way of affective connaturality, i.e., an obscure, but deep and penetrating knowledge of the very subsistence of a thing by bypassing the concept. Various modes of affective connaturality are described, namely, the connatural knowledge of the virtuous person, of the prudent person, of the natural law itself, of the mystic, the lover, and the poet. In connatural knowledge, intuition is seen to be both intellectual and emotion-laden. Given the various modes of intuition explored by Maritain, it is argued that intuition is central to Maritain's thought. It is further argued that the content of one's experience of the self and being known in the various modes of connatural knowledge is stored in the depths of the spiritual preconscious of the soul and acts as an indirect cause that disposes one to have an intuition of being should one be so gifted. In addition, connatural knowledge of being is also an indirect cause of creative insights in science, mathematics, and in all other kinds of knowledge. A kind of poetic intuition is at work everywhere, even when subordinated to the ends of some other kind of knowledge. Consequently, it is necessary to be a contemplative, especially for the philosopher who needs to be attuned and receptive to the mystery of being if he/she is to be gifted with the metaphysical intuition, without which one cannot be an authentic metaphysician of existence. The thought of Henri Bergson, Pierre Rousselot and the Maritain Thomist, Joseph Sikora, S. J. is heavily relied on in the exposition of the thesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ius Gentium as Publicly Articulated Moral ScienceMatthew K. MinerdAmong the various types of law discussed in St. Thomas's theological "treatise on law"—questions 90–108 of Summa theologia [ST] I-II—the classification known as the "law of nations" (ius gentium) holds an ambiguous epistemological position. Marking a kind of halfway point between the natural law and civil law, it seems to straddle both domains. In fact, in a particularly important text dedicated (...) to this topic in the ST (I-II, q. 95, a. 4), Aquinas classes the ius gentium as being closely connected to the natural law, though in a way that is somewhat derivative, not as immediately flowing from human nature (especially in its animality) as does the natural law, but also not as marked by human contingency as is human civil law.As was recently discussed in a well-documented and insightful article by Barrett H. Turner in The Thomist, there have historically been two main lines of Thomist interpretation concerning the exact character of the "law of nations." Very broadly stated, what he refers to as the "Salamancan" line, indebted to Francisco de Vitoria, "interprets Thomas's doctrine of the ius gentium as a body of universal positive institutions (that is, specifications, determinationes) added to the natural law by agreement of the human race."1 [End Page 1043] This position, which would be common for several centuries among members of the Thomist school, would locate the law of nations essentially in the domain of nearly universally adopted customs and institutions, not strictly deduced from the natural law, but rather grounded on "the quasi-political authority of the entire human race, which promulgates the ius gentium by customs whose utility for attaining the ends of the natural law under a certain set of social conditions is easily recognized by rational creatures."2Turner calls the other line of thought "Maritain's Neo-Thomist Line,"3 an outlook that would be shared with various nuances by thinkers like Jean-Marie Aubert, Yves Simon, Marie-Michel Labourdette, John Finnis, and others. Setting aside my qualms about his appellation "neo-Thomist," which does more to obscure than to illumine (for it covers a host of Thomistic figures who have significantly different views on what constitutes "Thomism"), Turner does fairly lay out the major lines of Jacques Maritain's position, which is most directly articulated in Man and the State and La loi naturelle ou loi non-écrite.4 Basing himself on his particular view of knowledge of the natural law through connaturality,5 Maritain contrasted this sort of moral cognition with that which develops in the line of conceptual articulation, thus having a different "gnoseological" character from our knowledge of the natural law, while nonetheless still sharing the same "ontological" foundation. Such conceptually articulated law would be the ius gentium.Rather than add my voice to the dialectic of the various thinkers arrayed by Turner into the two aforementioned camps, I would like to propose a slightly different approach to the "moral epistemology of the law of nations," though one that I believe lies in line with the best aspects of Maritain's approach. Continuing a series of reflections that I have undertaken [End Page 1044] concerning moral epistemology during the past few years,6 I propose that it is most helpful to consider the "law of nations" as being a form of reasoning pertaining to what Scholastic vocabulary would refer to as "moral science,"7 namely discursive philosophical reasoning concerning the essences, properties, effects, and various other essential relationships that belong to a human acts, morally considered (the principal subject of moral philosophy), along with other subjects that are studied in relation to this principal subject (e.g., the principles of human acts, most particularly, the structure of human acts and the moral virtues). Moral science is the activity of reasoning that can be undertaken by knowing agents living together in community, seeking to discursively articulate and explain the moral truth that forms the essential basis for the contingent determinations that will then be codified in particular civil laws, the latter of which are not concerned with questions like "what are the ultimate foundations for property... (shrink)

The following is an interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect focusing on Summa Theologiae I, qq. 75-89, and proposing that the agent intellect is a metaphysical rather than a formal a priori of human understanding. A formal a priori is responsible for the intelligibility as content of the object of human understanding and is related to Kant’s epistemological views; whereas a metaphysical a priori is responsible for intelligibility as mode of being of this same object. We can find in (...) class='Hi'>Aquinas’ text many indications that the agent intellect is not productive of the universal as content but is, rather, productive of the abstracted or intelligible mode of being of the universal nature. This is because for Aquinas the universal nature, which is the object of human understanding, is present in the things themselves but with a different mode of being. Chapter 1 is intended to establish the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, and provides two very important principles: one is that the object of human understanding (the universal nature) is present in the things themselves and, the other, that it is not in the things themselves with a mode of being which makes it available to the intellectual eye. These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), the agent intellect is productive not of the object’s intelligible content, but of its abstracted or intelligible mode of being (Chapter 4). (shrink)

This notion of knowledge through connaturality is classical in the Thomist school. Thomas Aquinas refers in this connection to the Pseudo--Dionysius, and to the Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, chapter V, where Aristotle states that the virtuous man is the rule and measure of human actions. I have no doubt that this notion, or equivalent notions, had, before Thomas Aquinas, a long history in human thought; an inquiry into this particular chapter in the history of ideas,--which would perhaps have (...) to take into account such philosophers as Ramanuja, and the Indian school of bhakti,--would be of considerable interest. I did not embark on such historical research; the question for me was rather to test the validity of the notion of knowledge through connaturality, as elaborated in the Thomist school, and more systematically to recognize the various domains to which it must be extended. (shrink)

The author presents and compares Maritain’s and Aquinas’s accounts of our discovery (1) of being as existing; and (2) of being as being (ens inquantum ens or the subject of metaphysics). He finds that especially in his final discussion of how one discovers being as being, Maritain’s account suffers greatly from the absence of any appeal to Aquinas’s negative judgment of separation and also from the omission of reference to the role of judgments of existence in (...) one’s discovery of a premetaphysical notion of being. Wippel finds no evidence in Aquinas’s texts for Maritain’s defense of an intuition of being or of existence. (shrink)

Originally titled Frontières de la poésie (1935), This book by Jacques Maritain, whose philosophical writings read as interestingly as a novel, will be welcomed by all who are seeking a better understanding of the art of our time. The book delves into Maritain's thoughts on the nature and subjectivity of art and poetry. As a philosopher, Maritain attempts to define the two concepts, describing art and poetry as "virtues," and as primarily concerned with beauty. Rather than focus (...) on aesthetic theory, Maritain examines the concepts at a more tangible level, including a discussion of how they are made. The principles established with such precision and brilliance in his earlier work "Art and Scholasticism," which has had such a deep influence on contemporary artists, are successfully put to the test in illuminating the creative works of such diverse artists as Rouault, Marc Chagall, Gino Sevirini, and Arthur Lourie. Jacques Maritain was a French Catholic philosopher and political thinker. He was born in Paris in 1882, where he spent most of his life. His father was a prominent lawyer and his mother the daughter of a statesman. He attended the Sorbonne to study philosophy and natural science, and after marrying, he and his wife converted to Catholicism. It was after this he became a well-known scholar of St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomistic philosophy. He published widely on philosophical and political thought, and by the 1930s, he was an established thinker in the Catholic community. After the outbreak of WWII, Maritain relocated to the United States, where he taught at Princeton University and Columbia University. Later in life, he and his wife returned to France, where he continued to write and study Catholic scholarship until his death in 1973. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Whose Red Garments?Which Divine Warrior? Thomas Aquinas on Isaiah 63 and the Literal Interpretation of the Old TestamentJoshua MaddenIntroductionIn attempting to discern the principles by which St. Thomas Aquinas offers a literal interpretation of the Old Testament, this essay will serve to highlight the tension between various periods and methods of biblical exegesis in the hope that it will allow a more fruitful engagement with the conclusions (...) of both St. Thomas and modern biblical commentators. In order to make this discernment, we begin first by addressing the concept of literal interpretation as a whole, as significant misunderstandings can arise in any discussion of what a "literal" reading of Scripture actually is. This exploration will serve our project well by allowing us to pin down precisely what is meant by this term, as well as why it should be important in any mode of theological exegesis (especially that of the Old Testament). When we are able to parse out the exact nature of literal interpretation and the implications of taking such an approach with regard to St. Thomas, we will then be capable of examining a particular instance of Thomas's exegesis by offering a test case of his methods in the reading of Isaiah 63, in which Isaiah prophesies the future appearance of a heavenly warrior who will bring both judgment and salvation to Israel.To sum up, we have two goals: to show that St. Thomas's understanding of the literal sense is both logically coherent and perennially illuminating, and to highlight a particular instance in which St. Thomas's exegesis and literal interpretation is employed in an insightful and creative manner. The conclusion of such an investigation will demonstrate that Aquinas is a [End Page 1201] valuable resource for the science of biblical exegesis precisely because of his philosophically robust methodology and his commitment to the grounding and foundational importance of the Old Testament's historical, literal sense.The Nature of Literal InterpretationAt the very outset of the Summa theologiae, St. Thomas deals with the issue of biblical interpretation and the various senses of Scripture. First, he clarifies what it means to speak of a literal sense of Scripture: "that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal."1 Having established what he means by the literal sense, he goes on to speak of the various spiritual senses—allegorical, moral, anagogical—and the way in which they are to be parsed out, but he is careful to note that a multiplication of senses does not necessitate equivocation in meaning: "Thus in holy Scripture no confusion results [from the multiplicity of senses] for all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory."2 To sum up: the literal, historical sense of Scripture is that meaning which is intended by the words themselves, and it is upon this understanding alone that any argument (and thus any theology) can be founded.3Now one should not take this definition of the literal sense as somehow historicizing or demystifying the text of Scripture, as though St. Thomas were concerned merely with what the words of the human authors mean. First, it is not merely the intention of the human author that must be ascertained, for the human author is not the only author: "The author of holy Scripture is God."4 In the preface to the Super Isaiam he says the same: "the author of Sacred Scripture is the Holy Spirit," and it is "the prophet's tongue" (lingua prophetae) which acts as the divine instrument (organum spiritus sancti).5 So [End Page 1202] here we have a necessary condition for literal interpretation, that it must treat God as the primary author of Scripture. Therefore, a literal exegesis of any particular text must take into account not only the intention of the human author, but the divine author as well.Let us proceed. It is a particularly modern approach to couch this search for the literal sense of the text as the search to ascertain "what the author meant." For St. Thomas, this is a... (shrink)

This paper examines Aquinas's contention that the virtues are necessarily connected, in such a way that anyone who fully possesses one of them, necessarily possesses them all. It is argued that this claim, as Aquinas develops it in the "Summa Theologiae", is more complex, interesting, and plausible than it is often taken to be. On his view, the cardinal virtues can be said to be connected in two senses, corresponding to the two senses in which certain virtues can (...) be said to be cardinal, namely, as general qualifications of all virtuous action and as particular normative ideals having a specific content. This distinction suggests, in turn, that Aquinas's claim that the virtues are connected should be understood as a psychological thesis about what is characteristic of the virtuous person's distinctive way of acting, as well as a thesis about the interrelationships among the different cardinal virtues considered as discrete normative ideals. So understood, Aquinas's claim that the virtues are connected is seen to be a necessary implication of his metaphysically grounded theory of human action. At the same time, it enables him to offer an interpretation of the complexities of moral discourse that is illuminating and at least prima facie plausible, taken on its own merits. (shrink)

Aquinas’s conception of faith has been taken to involve believing in a way that is expressly out of keeping with the evidence. Rather than being produced by evidence, the confidence involved in faith is a product of the will’s decision. This causes Aquinas’s conception of faith to look flagrantly irrational. Herein, I offer an interpretation of Aquinas’s position on faith that has not been previously proposed. I point out that Aquinas responds to the threat of faith’s (...) irrationality by explicitly maintaining that one may reasonably believe by faith because of an instinct to believe. I go on to point out other instances in which instincts amount to legitimate epistemic grounds for Aquinas. Given that this dimension of Aquinas’s thought is not well developed, I close by introducing some extensions of it in the work of John Henry Newman as well as points of contrast. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS AND THE LIBERATIONIST CRITIQUE OF MARITAIN'S NEW CHRISTENDOM I. RADITIONALLY CHRISTIANS have understood hat God's Kingdom is not of this world. It is not surprising, then, that history evinces some Christian difficulty in relating to thi's world. One aittitude takes ·a merely indirect interest in the world. Temporal activity is directed to the Church and its mission of saving souls. In this attitude the world has (...) only an instrumental value.1 Another attitude consists in a naive and innocent forgetfulness of temporal exigencies.2 A final one encompaisses 1 a disdain for temporal involvement.8 With its need for economic and political reform, the present century calls for a radical temporal engagement. For example, an indirect engagement by Catholics in the interest of the Church will not suffice. The Church shows an ability, even a resiliency, to exist in quite deficient temporal regimes. If the deficiencies of the present are to be remedied, it will be through the efforts of persons ·acknowledging more than an instrumental value to the temporal. Jacques Maritain, a Catholic layman, labored to establish the intellectual underpinnings for a radical Catholic engagement in the temporal. The masterpiece of this work is his In1 See Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. by Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), pp. 53-54. Jacques Maritain understands this "Political Augustinianism" as an unfortunate false inference from a medieval non-interest in the material order; see Integral Humanism, trans. by Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 12. As will be seen, Maritain wishes to transcend a merely instrumental valuation of the world; for example, see, ibid., pp. 176-7. 2 Maritain, op. oit., pp. 14-15, so characterizes the Middle Ages. 8 Ibid., pp. 102-3. 247 248 JOHN F. X.!{NASAS tegral HumaniMn. The text understands" humanism" in terms of a this-worldly perfection. Maritian says, Humanism tends essentially to render man more truly human, and to manifest his original greatness by having him participate in all that which can enrich him in nature and in history...; it at once demands that man develop the virtualities contained within him, his creative forces and the life of reason, and work to make the forces of the physical world instruments of his freedom.4 That human nature contains such temporal capacities, Maritain later calls the "ontosophic truth." In his Peasant of the Garonne, Maritain speaks of the natural end of the world. By " world " Maritain especially understands " our human universe, the universe of man, of culture and history in their development here below." 5 The end of this world is three-fold.6 First is the mastery of nature by man and also the securement of freedom from servitude to other men. Second is the development of the spiritual activities of man, especially knowledge in the forms of wisdom and natural Finally, of " the manifestation of all the potentialities of human nature." How does a Christian come to make a radical commitment to the realization of these temporal capacities? It is not through any forsaking of his eternal destiny. Rather, for Maritain the temporal engagement follows in and through a deeper appreciation of that eternal destiny. The focus of this deeper appreciation is Christian sanctity. For Maritain only the saint is the true humanist. Why? Maritain concedes that sanctity is first and foremost a love of God. But because God has made 4 Ibid., p. 2. 5.Jacques Maritain, The Peasamt of the Garonne, trans. by Michael O'uddih(Y and Elizabeth Hughes (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 39. 6 Ibid., pp. 40-1. See also Maritain's, On the Philosophy of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 125-7. Another apparent reference to the ontosophic truth is Maritain's discussion of "felicite en mouvement," or "l'imparfaite felicite," in N euf Legons sur les Notions Premieres de la Philosophie Morale (Paris: Chez Pierre Tequi, 1949), pp. 99-102. For a diagrammatic rendering of the temporal and eternal planes, see Maritain, On Philosophy of History, p. 129. LIBERATIONIST CRITIQUE OF MARITAIN'S CHRISTENDOM 249 all in his likeness, the saint's... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 149 Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel: Interpretations of St. Thomas Aquinas in German Nominalism on the Eve of the Reformation. By JOHN L. FARTHING. Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 9. Durham: Duke University Press, 1988. Pp. x +265. $22.50 (cloth). In this hook, John Farthing examines the use made by the fifteenth· century theologian Gabriel Biel of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. (...) Contemplating the various aspects of what he calls the ' dialogue ' between Biel and Aquinas {see e.g., pp. ix, 58, 191), Farthing wants to determine the extent and quality of Biel's knowledge and appropriation of Thomas's thought. Biel was a major shaper of contemporary theological opinion, who stood in the Occamist tradition in theology. Yet, although he himself shared Occamist presuppositions in theology and usually came out in various theological disputes on the Occamist side (pp. 5, 6, 8, 13-14, 16, 28, 33, 56, 122), as has long been recognized Biel often made a determined effort in his analyses to become acquainted with, and to repor·t, the thought of significant non-Occamist theologians, including Thomas Aquinas. Farthing thus justifies the present study by asking how precisely Thomas figures in the ' theological enterprise' of Gabriel Biel: Farthing wants to know how Biel used Aquinas and what Biel learned from his reading of Aquinas (pp. ix, 68 ). While Biel's significance for late fifteenth-century thought in itself justifies a study of his theological project and method, Farthing also believes that this hook on Biel and Aquinas is warranted on other grounds as well. Martin Luther learned much about scholasticism through his mastery of Biel's corpus. Hence, by establishing the quality of Biel's study and reporting of Aquinas on various theological questions, Farthing prepares the way for a future study of Luther's knowledge of Aquinas, a task however that he will leave to others (pp. x, 5, 7). Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel is divided into ten chapters. After a brief Preface in which he provides the rationale for this study and an opening chapter on Thomas Aquinas and the via moderna, Farthing looks in turn at Biel's reading of Aquinas in the subject areas "God and Creatures," "Christ and Mary," "The Human Condition," "Ethics," "Church, Ministry, and Worship," "Sacraments," "Justification," and "Eschatology; " the tenth chapter, entitled "Post Thomam," summarizes the principal results of Farthing's research. After listing in an early footnote the hooks on Aquinas which he has found especially useful on each subject, Farthing in each chapter examines Biel's citations of Aquinas on the topic at hand. As he pro- 150 BOOK REVIEWS ceeds through each chapter, Farthing is careful to indicate when Biel has misread or misquoted Aquinas, offering in these instances possible reasons for Biel's errors. The longest chapters are on ethics and on sacraments (Chapters Five and Seven), reflecting Biel's own greater interest in these aspects of Thomistic theology (pp. 103, 191). On the basis of this close study, Farthing offers the following general conclusions about Biel's reading of Thomas Aquinas. On the whole, Biel is accurate in his reporting of Thomas's thought on various questions : Farthing claims that " statistically speaking, it is exceedingly rare for Biel to lay himself open to the change of infidelity to Thomas's intention" (p. 193). Second, Biel exploits Thomas's expertise more on ' practical ' than on ' speculative ' matters; the greater number of Thomas citations in Biel have to do with ethics and practical issues associated with the sacraments (pp. 58, 94, 191, 195-96). Third, Biel holds Aquinas in esteem because he sees in Thomas a thinker who shares his interest in summarizing and reporting fairly the thought of other theologians. In this regard, Biel often uses Aquinas as one today would use a' theological encyclopedia' (the term, in fact, is Farthing's; see pp. 26, 132). Biel wants to provide for his own time as extensive as possible a spectrum of opinions on a given question ; to this end he takes over Aquinas's characterizations of different theological opinions on the question at hand. Fourth, while Aquinas's thought is usually fairly reported, Biel does occasionally misrepresent Thomas... (shrink)

Among the many fruitful and challenging sites for mutual engagement of theology and philosophy, the renewed study of St. Thomas Aquinas has proven to be both lively and controversial. Given particular impetus in recent years by the widespread assessment of modernity that occupies many academic disciplines today, this study is both interesting and relevant to a number of intellectual debates, even as it demands for itself the highest level of scholarship. This collection reflects the state of Aquinas studies (...) throughout North America, Britain, and Northern Europe, and provides an introduction to this diversity for a general and scholarly readership. Widely differing and often starkly contrasting and even contradictory interpretations of Aquinas are to be found here, which by their very differences invite readers to go deeper into the background from which each emerges and so to find for themselves a way to contemplate Aquinas. "This excellent collection of rich, sometimes controversial papers is an attempt to set the study of Thomas Aquinas in context and to extend our understanding of Aquinas's thought in the process. It is indispensable reading for anyone interested in the contemporary state of Thomistic studies and its history." --Eleonore Stump, Henle Professor of Philosophy, St. Louis University "This is a fine collection further demonstrating the sheer variety and vitality of contemporary Thomistic studies. By challenging and unsettling established assumptions the essayists help to free the work of one of the greatest educators in the ways of Christian wisdom to speak with fresh relevance. The result is an invaluable resource for teachers and students of theology alike." --Paul D. Murray, Durham University. (shrink)

Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of inner sense. The thesis of intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy (...) of mind, with special reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. He argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics. (shrink)

The idea of “nature” performs an important cultural work. The cyborg‐nature is an attempt to free ourselves from the features of the culturally authorized concepts of nature. The cyborg offers new metaphors to both academic and popular theorizing for comprehending the different ways that sciences and technologies affect our lives, subjectivities, and concepts. The cyborg is a lived reality and a metaphor. Paul Tillich deemed it necessary to have a mythos of technology to explain our technologies and ourselves. He offered (...) “The Technical City” as a symbol for his age. Donna Haraway's cy‐borg‐figure could function as a symbol to interpret our time and technologies and ourselves. (shrink)

Deductivism has been variously presented as an evaluative thesis and as an interpretive one. I argue that deductivism fails as a universal evaluative thesis, and as such that its value as an interpretive thesis must be supported on other grounds. As a reconstructive strategy, deductivism is justified only on the grounds that an arguer is, or ought to be, aiming at the deductive standard of evidence. As such, the reconstruction of an argument as deductive must be supported by contextual and (...) situational factors including facts about the arguer. Further, the plausibility of deductivism as a normative thesis is not tied to its plausibility as a descriptive or interpretive thesis. (shrink)

Fundamental social changes in any society are impossible without the formation of a high level of social activity of the individual in particular and society as a whole. In the context of this important role plays the study of the correlation of will and need as an important precondition of social activity. Actually, it is the will as a creative impulse to action not only the basis of awareness of needs, but also the ascending position of the daily choice of (...) man. On the basis of awareness and focus on the choice of the direction of activity in the individual and public consciousness formed a holistic image of the purpose of the practical transformation of the world of nature and the world of culture. In the act of will, the subject legitimizes and authorizes the subjective desire, which is constituted in this process as objectively directed meta activity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:St. Thomas Aquinas's Appeal to St. John the Baptist as a Benchmark of Spiritual GreatnessJohn Baptist Ku, O.P.When we think of sources of St. Thomas Aquinas's speculative theology, we rightly recall teachings given in Scripture—such as that sin came into the world through one man (Rom 5:12) or that all that the Father has belongs also to the Son (John 16:15)—as well as teachings, based on Scripture, (...) imparted by Church councils or Fathers, such as that Christ is one person with two natures1 or that the human nature of Christ is an instrument of his divinity.2 In the project of faith seeking understanding, these teachings lead expeditiously to distinctions and clarifications concerning person and nature, habit and action, primary and instrumental causality, intellect and will, faith and reason, and the like. However, the saints themselves too serve as a source for Aquinas's speculative theological reflection. Though they admittedly constitute a less abundant source than scriptural, conciliar, or patristic teaching, the saints' contribution to Aquinas's theology merits our attention.For instance, in "Jean-Baptiste: figure du prêcheur chez Thomas d'Aquin," Jean-Pierre Torrell observes that Aquinas's research into the Fathers of the Church for the Catena aurea bore considerable influence on his subsequent works, and Torrell documents how Aquinas's treatment of John the Baptist is a precise case that shows this influence.3 More recent [End Page 1119] scholarship has, fortunately, taken note of the saints' contribution to Aquinas's theology—in the figures of St. Benedict and the virgin martyrs.4This article will therefore examine St. John the Baptist as just such a source of Aquinas's speculative theology. Aquinas appeals to St. John as a benchmark of spiritual greatness against which to situate other figures: Christ, angels, Mary, apostles, prophets, evangelists, priests, and the people of God. By examining these cases, we will not only observe the Angelic Doctor's appreciation of the saints as our teachers, as examples to be imitated, and as proofs of God's love in transformative grace; we will also witness aspects of the Dominican master's theological method, that is, in his manner of interpreting Scripture and his application of reason to scriptural data to make arguments and draw conclusions.5 For instance, in his treatment of the least in the kingdom of heaven, Scripture will definitively confirm what theological reasoning can determine concerning the knowledge of those with the beatific vision. Furthermore, his exposition on the Blessed Virgin will reveal that he reads the Bible as a whole with one divine author, in support of traditional interpretations.6 However, he is not naive about diverse human authorship and the literal versus the spiritual senses [End Page 1120] of Scripture,7 and his methodology unveils his explicit conviction that Scripture must be the basis of theological claims.8My presentation will unfold in five sections. After (1) a glance at some of Aquinas's comments on the authority of various sources of theology so as to situate our conversation about the saints as a source of theology, I will review Aquinas's enlistment of John the Baptist as a standard by which to establish: (2) three simple points about Christians and Christ—that all of the articles of faith must be accepted, that prepubescent children can enter religious life, and that Christ's baptism manifests divine power—(3) the superiority of angels to wayfarers, among whom John the Baptist is the greatest, followed by apostles, prophets, and evangelists; (4) the eminence of John the Baptist and a ranking, in order, of God, angels, John the Baptist, prophets, priests, and then God's people; and (5) the holiness of Mary the Mother of God.The Authority of Various Sources of TheologyIn just a few lines in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas identifies the roles of reason and authority in theology. On one hand, "it is most proper" to theology to offer "proofs from authority," since theology's "principles are known through revelation"—making theological arguments dependent on "the authority of those making the revelation." But on the other hand, theology "also uses human reason, not to... (shrink)

Aquinas' first proof for God's existence is usually interpreted as a metaphysical argument immune to any objections coming from empirical science. Connections to Aquinas' own historical understanding of physics and cosmology are ignored or downplayed. Nature and Nature's God proposes a natural philosophical interpretation of Aquinas' argument more sensitive to the broader context of Aquinas' work and yielding a more historically accurate account of the argument. Paradoxically, the book also shows that, on such an interpretation, (...) class='Hi'>Aquinas' argument is not only consistent with modern science, but actually confirmed by the history of science, from classical mechanics through 19th century thermodynamics to contemporary cosmology. The first part of the book considers Aquinas' argument in its historical context, exploring the key principles that everything in motion is moved by something else and that an infinite regress of causes is impossible. The structure of the First Way is analyzed and the argument is connected both with Aquinas' Third Way-a new interpretation of which is also proposed-and Aquinas' second proof from motion in the Summa contra Gentiles. To complete the account of what natural philosophy-prior to metaphysics-can demonstrate about God, a chapter on Aquinas' teleological argument (the Fifth Way) is also included. The second part of the book tracks the history of modern science from Copernicus to today, showing how Aquinas' argument fared at each major turn. The first chapter shows how Newton's understanding of inertia and conservation of momentum supports the idea that motion cannot continue forever without God's causality, and integrates a modern understanding of inertia and gravity with the principles of Thomistic natural philosophy. The second chapter considers the first and second laws of thermodynamics, showing how they too support Aquinas' contention that motion cannot continue forever without God's causality. This chapter also discusses statistical mechanics and contemporary cosmology, demonstrating that science continues to support Aquinas' unmoved mover argument. The final chapter turns to modern biology as well as cosmological fine-tuning to show that modern science also continues to support Aquinas' teleological argument. The result is not only a satisfying defense of Aquinas' natural philosophical proofs for God's existence, but a primer on the broader project of integrating Thomistic natural philosophy with modern science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS AND THE LIBERATIONIST CRITIQUE OF MARITAIN'S NEW CHRISTENDOM I. RADITIONALLY CHRISTIANS have understood hat God's Kingdom is not of this world. It is not surprising, then, that history evinces some Christian difficulty in relating to thi's world. One aittitude takes ·a merely indirect interest in the world. Temporal activity is directed to the Church and its mission of saving souls. In this attitude the world has (...) only an instrumental value.1 Another attitude consists in a naive and innocent forgetfulness of temporal exigencies.2 A final one encompaisses 1 a disdain for temporal involvement.8 With its need for economic and political reform, the present century calls for a radical temporal engagement. For example, an indirect engagement by Catholics in the interest of the Church will not suffice. The Church shows an ability, even a resiliency, to exist in quite deficient temporal regimes. If the deficiencies of the present are to be remedied, it will be through the efforts of persons ·acknowledging more than an instrumental value to the temporal. Jacques Maritain, a Catholic layman, labored to establish the intellectual underpinnings for a radical Catholic engagement in the temporal. The masterpiece of this work is his In1 See Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. by Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), pp. 53-54. Jacques Maritain understands this "Political Augustinianism" as an unfortunate false inference from a medieval non-interest in the material order; see Integral Humanism, trans. by Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 12. As will be seen, Maritain wishes to transcend a merely instrumental valuation of the world; for example, see, ibid., pp. 176-7. 2 Maritain, op. oit., pp. 14-15, so characterizes the Middle Ages. 8 Ibid., pp. 102-3. 247 248 JOHN F. X.!{NASAS tegral HumaniMn. The text understands" humanism" in terms of a this-worldly perfection. Maritian says, Humanism tends essentially to render man more truly human, and to manifest his original greatness by having him participate in all that which can enrich him in nature and in history...; it at once demands that man develop the virtualities contained within him, his creative forces and the life of reason, and work to make the forces of the physical world instruments of his freedom.4 That human nature contains such temporal capacities, Maritain later calls the "ontosophic truth." In his Peasant of the Garonne, Maritain speaks of the natural end of the world. By " world " Maritain especially understands " our human universe, the universe of man, of culture and history in their development here below." 5 The end of this world is three-fold.6 First is the mastery of nature by man and also the securement of freedom from servitude to other men. Second is the development of the spiritual activities of man, especially knowledge in the forms of wisdom and natural Finally, of " the manifestation of all the potentialities of human nature." How does a Christian come to make a radical commitment to the realization of these temporal capacities? It is not through any forsaking of his eternal destiny. Rather, for Maritain the temporal engagement follows in and through a deeper appreciation of that eternal destiny. The focus of this deeper appreciation is Christian sanctity. For Maritain only the saint is the true humanist. Why? Maritain concedes that sanctity is first and foremost a love of God. But because God has made 4 Ibid., p. 2. 5.Jacques Maritain, The Peasamt of the Garonne, trans. by Michael O'uddih(Y and Elizabeth Hughes (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 39. 6 Ibid., pp. 40-1. See also Maritain's, On the Philosophy of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 125-7. Another apparent reference to the ontosophic truth is Maritain's discussion of "felicite en mouvement," or "l'imparfaite felicite," in N euf Legons sur les Notions Premieres de la Philosophie Morale (Paris: Chez Pierre Tequi, 1949), pp. 99-102. For a diagrammatic rendering of the temporal and eternal planes, see Maritain, On Philosophy of History, p. 129. LIBERATIONIST CRITIQUE OF MARITAIN'S CHRISTENDOM 249 all in his likeness, the saint's... (shrink)

Aquinas teaches that the acquired moral virtues associated with the civil life are to be differentiated from the gratuitous moral virtues associated with the spiritual life. An interpretation of Aquinas will benefit from situating his various remarks on the moral virtues within the context of his teaching regarding how Christian persons develop in virtue over time. In this account, Aquinas makes a distinction between the moral virtues exercised in this life and in heaven, as well as between (...) three stages of the Christian moral life in via. I argue that Aquinas indicates that for Christian persons the acquired moral virtues are retained in the active life in via, but not in patria. Further, claims that Aquinas makes regarding the relationship between the contemplative moral virtues and the active moral virtues provide an analogy for understanding how infused charity might relate to the acquired moral virtues. (shrink)

The great chain of being is an ontological conception in which all beings, from inanimate things to God, are ranked on a scale according to their perfectness. This hierarchical scheme, though widely known in the history of ideas, was systematically addressed by Arthur Lovejoy in 1936. The great chain of being as formulated by Lovejoy is composed of three main principles, whose roots can be found in Plato and Aristotle’s philosophies. These principles are “the principle of plenitude”, “the principle of (...) gradation” and “the principle of continuity.” The first principle, the principle of plenitude, was pointed out in Plato’s philosophy and the latter two, the principle of gradation and the principle of continuity, were addressed in Aristotle’s philosophy. According to Lovejoy, these three principles were systematically addressed in Plotinus’s philosophy and became an essential part of Neo-Platonic cosmology. Platon explains the abundance of beings with reference to the absolute goodness of the God in his famous book Timaios. Accordingly, God has absolute goodness and this attribution has given rise to an abundance of beings as goodness requires the existence of things. The other two principles, the principle of gradation and the principle of continuity, were forwarded by Aristotle and through his works affected Western thought. While the principle of gradation refers to the ranking of beings in a chain based on the criteria of their perfection, the principle of continuity is the natural consequence of that ranking in that all beings share at least a minimum level of similarity. Plotinus synthesized and systematized those three principles as an expression of ranked beings specific to emanation theory and added three hypostasis -One, Nous, and Soul- in addition to the natural world addressed in Aristotle’s works. Therefore, we see that beings were ranked from inanimate things to God in Plotinus’s works. This concept of hierarchical order of beings, the great chain of being, affected many cultures and philosophical ideas from Classical Islamic philosophy to the Western tradition. In this article, we confine our subject to only Western thought, including Medieval Christian theology and philosophy, the Renaissance period, and the Age of Enlightenment as well as a peculiar implication and interpretation of the great chain of being specific to modern times. In every period we will deal with just one thinker and their ideas to demonstrate the effect of the great chain of being on those thinkers’ philosophies and systems. In this context, we examined how Thomas Aquinas used the great chain of being to justify some theological and philosophical matters and tried to show how he utilized the principle of continuity effectively to explain the relationship between matter and soul. Marcilio Ficino, a Neo-Platonist philosopher of the Renaissance period, also used the great chain of being to explain the hierarchical order of beings and their ontological relationship to the perfect being, which is God, placing them in a rising line according to their closeness to God. On the other hand, when we come to the Age of Enlightenment we see that the great chain of being continues to be apparent in some philosophical works. One example is John Locke’s famous book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Here Locke tries to make sense of the existence of many species of spirits with reference to the great chain of being, especially by using the principle of continuity. This attempt of justification shows us that the great chain of being, as an old philosophical and ontological concept, was still used even in the Enlightenment. Finally, it would be beneficial to address how the chain of being in question was presented and understood in modern times. Unlike the justification of some philosophical or theological subjects, in modern times the hierarchical structure of the great chain of being has been anachronistically read into the theory of evolution with reference to some medieval Muslim philosophers’ works. This approach, however, springs from the figural similarities between the great chain of being and the theory of evolution, although the contents of both theories are completely different. It would be accepted easily that similarities in figure do not necessitate similarities in content. In short, the great chain of being has been very effectively used in the history of philosophy to justify different subjects in different areas such as philosophy and theology. In this article, we address the usages of the chain in question and trace its effects specific to the Western tradition from the ancient period to modern times. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BRUCE MARSHALL'S READING OF AQUINAS Lours RoY, O.P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts IN AN ARTICLE published by The Thomist,1 Bruce D. Marshall argues that Aquinas should be viewed as a ' postliberal theologian,' that is to say, as propounding basically the same account of truth as the one put forward by George A. Lindbeck.2 In the same issue of The Thomist,3 Lindbeck not only approves Marshall's (...) interpretation of his book but goes so far as to write: "My 'cultural-linguistic' account of religious belief is in part a clumsy rendition in modern philosophical and sociological idioms of what Aquinas often said more fully and more precisely long ago " (405).4 And he adds : " Thus by showing how St. Thomas can be understood in a way consistent with Nature of Doctrine, Bruce Marshall has explained the view of truth which I had in mind better than I explained it myself " (406). In order to keep this note relatively short, I shall bypass the question of whether Marshall's presentation of Lindbeck's thought is merely a clarification or an actual revision of it. Let us simply note the fact that Lindbeck has praised Marshall's rendering without any reservation. 1" Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (1989) : 352-402. 2 The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). a " Response to Bruce Marshall," 403-406. 4. This acknowledgment should not be taken lightly, given the remarkable acquaintance with the thought of Aquinas that Lindbeck has shown for many years. See his article, " The A Priori in St. Thomas' Theory of Knowledge " in The Heritage of Christian Thought, ed. Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 41-63. 473 474 LOUIS ROY, O.P. The question I should like to raise bears on the accuracy of Marshall's representation of Aquinas. Marshall is undoubtedly a fine analyst of Thomas's writings. His selection of texts evinces a mastery of Thomas's corpus. He convincingly shows that there is a great similarity between Aquinas's and Lindbeck's views regarding the paramount role of faith in the access to truth. Marshall 's piece may even have suggested to some readers that, in this respect, Aquinas could be closer to a confessionalist like Lindbeck than to a revisionist like Tracy. I shall return to this hypothesis in my conclusion. Therefore, if Marshall's reading of Thomas is sound, it should be a valuable contribution to a recent debate among some confessionalists, Thomists, and revisionists.G 1. Marshall wants to test Aquinas on some distinctions drawn from Lindbeck. He begins by acknowledging that Aquinas has a correspondence theory of truth. He adds that, in matters of faith, it is impossible to verify whether one's beliefs correspond or not with what is the reality. Far from demonstrating their tenets, believers simply hold as true what has been revealed by God. So far as truths that go beyond the capacity of human reason are concerned, Thomas repeatedly asserts that no one can prove them. Given the impossibility of showing that doctrines correspond with the reality of God, the question arises: How can Christians sort out which doctrines are true? In answer to this question, Marshall introduces a distinction between the theory of truth (namely, correspondence) and the criteria by which people can justify the truth of their assertions, especially in matters which are not susceptible of proof. There are two such criteria : linguistic G These three positions are represented in the articles written by William C. Placher, Colman E. O'Neill, James J. Buckley, and David Tracy for the "Review Symposium" of Lindbeck's book, published by The Thomist 49 (1985): 392-472. Marshall's piece, which I shall discuss here, is a reply to O'Neill. In order not to make things too complicated, I will not refer to O'Neill's article, since Marshall's treatment of Aquinas is clear in itself, regardless of his disagreement with O'Neill. READING OF AQUINAS 475 coherence and practical coherence. Marshall claims that both of them are operative in the thought of Aquinas.6 Let us recall the question: How... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BRUCE MARSHALL'S READING OF AQUINAS Lours RoY, O.P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts IN AN ARTICLE published by The Thomist,1 Bruce D. Marshall argues that Aquinas should be viewed as a ' postliberal theologian,' that is to say, as propounding basically the same account of truth as the one put forward by George A. Lindbeck.2 In the same issue of The Thomist,3 Lindbeck not only approves Marshall's (...) interpretation of his book but goes so far as to write: "My 'cultural-linguistic' account of religious belief is in part a clumsy rendition in modern philosophical and sociological idioms of what Aquinas often said more fully and more precisely long ago " (405).4 And he adds : " Thus by showing how St. Thomas can be understood in a way consistent with Nature of Doctrine, Bruce Marshall has explained the view of truth which I had in mind better than I explained it myself " (406). In order to keep this note relatively short, I shall bypass the question of whether Marshall's presentation of Lindbeck's thought is merely a clarification or an actual revision of it. Let us simply note the fact that Lindbeck has praised Marshall's rendering without any reservation. 1" Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (1989) : 352-402. 2 The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). a " Response to Bruce Marshall," 403-406. 4. This acknowledgment should not be taken lightly, given the remarkable acquaintance with the thought of Aquinas that Lindbeck has shown for many years. See his article, " The A Priori in St. Thomas' Theory of Knowledge " in The Heritage of Christian Thought, ed. Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 41-63. 473 474 LOUIS ROY, O.P. The question I should like to raise bears on the accuracy of Marshall's representation of Aquinas. Marshall is undoubtedly a fine analyst of Thomas's writings. His selection of texts evinces a mastery of Thomas's corpus. He convincingly shows that there is a great similarity between Aquinas's and Lindbeck's views regarding the paramount role of faith in the access to truth. Marshall 's piece may even have suggested to some readers that, in this respect, Aquinas could be closer to a confessionalist like Lindbeck than to a revisionist like Tracy. I shall return to this hypothesis in my conclusion. Therefore, if Marshall's reading of Thomas is sound, it should be a valuable contribution to a recent debate among some confessionalists, Thomists, and revisionists.G 1. Marshall wants to test Aquinas on some distinctions drawn from Lindbeck. He begins by acknowledging that Aquinas has a correspondence theory of truth. He adds that, in matters of faith, it is impossible to verify whether one's beliefs correspond or not with what is the reality. Far from demonstrating their tenets, believers simply hold as true what has been revealed by God. So far as truths that go beyond the capacity of human reason are concerned, Thomas repeatedly asserts that no one can prove them. Given the impossibility of showing that doctrines correspond with the reality of God, the question arises: How can Christians sort out which doctrines are true? In answer to this question, Marshall introduces a distinction between the theory of truth (namely, correspondence) and the criteria by which people can justify the truth of their assertions, especially in matters which are not susceptible of proof. There are two such criteria : linguistic G These three positions are represented in the articles written by William C. Placher, Colman E. O'Neill, James J. Buckley, and David Tracy for the "Review Symposium" of Lindbeck's book, published by The Thomist 49 (1985): 392-472. Marshall's piece, which I shall discuss here, is a reply to O'Neill. In order not to make things too complicated, I will not refer to O'Neill's article, since Marshall's treatment of Aquinas is clear in itself, regardless of his disagreement with O'Neill. READING OF AQUINAS 475 coherence and practical coherence. Marshall claims that both of them are operative in the thought of Aquinas.6 Let us recall the question: How... (shrink)